

# A CITY WITHOUT WALLS

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## NOTES ON TERROR & COUNTER-TERRORISM\*

\*"When it comes to death we all live in a city without walls"

*Epicurus*

### TERROR<sup>1</sup> AND THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE PRESENT

**T**HUCYDIDES SAYS that he began his *History* not in the aftermath of the war, as most would, but instead at the very beginning of the conflict. His would be a history of the present, a history that is written as it is lived. This sentiment was taken up by Xenophon, who completed Thucydides' work with his own *History of My Times*. Thucydides begins his "history at the very outbreak of the war, in the belief that it was going to be a great war and more worth writing about than those which had taken place in the past... This was the great disturbance in the history of the Hellenes, affecting also a large part of the non-Hellenic world, and indeed, I might say, the whole of mankind."<sup>2</sup> This was a revolutionary task, a history undertaken without archives and without the benefit of hindsight. Now we find ourselves — and seemingly the whole of humanity — immersed in an era of terrorist war, a war without fronts in space and one that is without end. It is yet another war unlike any other before it, but it is a war that inflicts all of the accumulated punishments and crimes of those before it. Everywhere it seems there are as then only those "committed to one side or the other; even those who were not immediately engaged were deliberating on the courses which they were to take later."<sup>3</sup> Facing the specter of terror, we find ourselves confronted by the same questions that might have plagued Thucydides: why do we do this work and how does one do a history of the present? For Thucydides there was only the history of the present — its *archaeology*. For him, there would be no more Troys — which was comparatively speaking only a raiding party — and no more Homeric heroes, but forever forward history was to be made by the living and propelled by their accumulation of capital. Similarly, for our time, the soon to be mythic tyrants of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries are also relics of a passing disciplinary society. "There will be no more Stalins, no more Hitlers" in this era of terrorist war, but only the accumulation of a history where civilization is said to sustain itself where "millions are daily tortured, stifled, punished, silenced, [and] oppressed."<sup>5</sup>

We are often told that terror may be the defining characteristic of our time and yet terror is also said to be beyond the capacity of civilized people to understand. To describe it and its importance it is first necessary to delve into the record of the transformations in the practice of terror. These transformations have profound implications for contemporary politics and for the relation of earlier critical work to the present critique of everyday life. The meaning of terror — its causes and explanations — should not be taken as given or obvious. Nor should terror be moralized in terms of good or bad, just or unjust. It is unfortunate, but not at all surprising that works by government specialists, commissions, and by most proponents of American policy — and some of its opponents as well — have focused on the nature and rationale of Just War, on the morality of terror and its role in the spectral clash of civilizations and world ideologies. Even the best of these works, such as *Lessons of Terror*,<sup>6</sup> address terror as a force that has always been with us, at least as long as the State has existed. To step away from this kind of interpretation would be to leave aside the idea that the meaning of terror is already given, and also to assume that terror and virtue can and often do appear together. Is it not true that throughout the history of the West, the priest and the executioner have walked hand in hand?

If, however, one were to pause briefly and consider how it is that terror has been discussed, where it has been proposed, approved, invoked and deployed, and finally whether it has been said to reside either with the state or against it, such a pause might lead to an understanding of terror from which might emerge a politics of counter-terrorism as opposed to superficial analyses.

### WARS WITHOUT END?

In the aftermath of two centuries where one found “piled up mountains of corpses where ever power was at stake,”<sup>7</sup> we have been subjected to several new strategic contests: the Cold War, the War on Drugs, and “the war to end all wars.”<sup>8</sup> Like these, the War on Terror is a terroristic war, i.e., it is not just a war against an enemy, but a war that produces terror and its accumulated artifacts. Just Wars must always be positive. On all fronts it must finally — always finally — be the war to end all wars. This *Just War Against Terror*<sup>9</sup> is not merely justifiable but a war for justice itself in which we are, of course and always, virtuous. But this is also a war waged to create fear and a desire for the protection of a community mobilized for a war without end. “Virtue must rule through terror”<sup>10</sup> in a war where all of the combatants are allied

in their opposition to each other. The factions recognize each other as the enemy and so justify the war through the terrorizing of the enemy, for fear along with desire are forces of politics.<sup>11</sup> If terror has been created by and for us, then it has shown itself to be a rational institutionalized terror and not the result of irrational dreams or false ideologies. Al Qaeda's main strength is not its brutal fanaticism, but that its centralized organizational and bureaucratic structure could so easily transform itself easily into a fluid and scattered insurgency that does not seek to establish a state of its own. Terror is released from the tutelage of the state and opposes it, but it is never outside of the State.

The war on terror appears to us as an external conflict. "At home," it appears most often as a threat from "increased chatter" and an "alert level," than as a reality approaching from "over there." If the war on terror is "at home," it happened at "ground zero;" which was an interesting and obvious reference in itself, instantly invoking that other seeming War without End, replete with its own weapons of mass destruction: the Cold War. The war on terror intensifies our internalization of terror so that "the war is in everybody now."<sup>12</sup> Never, even for a brief period, have we lived without terror. During the Cold War, everyone knew that 15 minutes was all it took for missiles to reach Moscow and Washington. During the Cold War, we lived under a peace guaranteed by the terror of "Mutually Assured Destruction." The terror of nuclear annihilation has proven obsolete, and now we are terrorized by terrorism and by the ideologists of terror.

If terror has manifested itself as a real, material force in the world and not just as phantoms or pathological desires, then terror is now expressed in the fundamental rejection of emancipation in favor of a desire for control: the control over oneself, the control over others, the control over nature, the control over destiny, soul, history, etc. — all of which appear as discontinuous struggles within a more general social development, but are perhaps continuous or coterminous modes of control in discontinuous social formations. The desire for control now finds expression in the religious supplicant and the Bush Administration of the United States — united in their mutual desire for religion over reason, and for control in opposition to those "certain inalienable rights." Enlightened Reason produces its own forms of terror in the administered society with such representations as the accountant and the foreman, the administered life, and the management of the family and the community. Nothing could be a more melancholy truth but that Enlightenment remains the only opposition to the virtuous terror. It opposes this terror, though, with its own apparatus of terror: the terror of the state

as the virtuous republic. It is within the State that reason and terror are joined together and made virtuous.

This essay is of necessity incomplete and already in need of revisions, deletions, and additions. It is presented as a series of notes on the history of the present, i.e., on the period of terror, and so, like the experience of the everyday, must be rewritten every day.

### **FROM THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS TO THE WAR AGAINST CIVILIZATION**

By the victims they choose, and by the means they use, the terrorists have clarified the struggle we are in. Those who target relief workers for death have set themselves against all humanity. Those who incite murder and celebrate suicide reveal their contempt for life itself. They have no place in any religious faith, they have no claim on the world's sympathy, and they should have no friend in this chamber. Events during the past two years have set before us the clearest of divides: Between those who seek order, and those who spread chaos; between those who work for peaceful change, and those who adopt the methods of gangsters; between those who honour the rights of man, and those who deliberately take the lives of men, and women, and children, without mercy or shame. Between these alternatives there is no neutral ground. All governments that support terror are complicit in a war against civilization. No government should ignore the threat of terror, because to look the other way gives terrorists the chance to regroup, and recruit, and prepare. And all nations that fight terror, as if the lives of their own people depend on it, will earn the favourable judgment of history.<sup>13</sup>

"The End of History" is no longer being proclaimed as it was during the collapse of the Soviet Union. As it has through the age of Enlightenment, progress is revealed as terror — as the rationality of humans turned against us in the name of a "greater good." The struggle against terror was "clarified" by the attacks of 9/11. The strategies and justifications followed easily: the victims of 9/11 were innocent, but the most innocent of the innocent are the relief workers. In contrast to them, terrorists incite murder and celebrate the martyrdom of their suicidal comrades. These terrorists are not only beneath contempt and, for the Good Christian, incapable of redemption — at least without the discipline of torture and torments. These people are

described as being without virtue, without authentic faith, depraved, and deprived of the sympathy and the understanding that comes with civilization. To be cast out has greater implications than simple deportation. Deprived of a national/social base, a terrorist organization and its individual members are deprived of rights. Lacking even those fundamental or inherent rights, “the clearest of divides” is that between order/chaos, peaceful change/gangsterism and illegality, honoring rights/taking life. There is no ambiguity in the administration’s rhetoric, no “neutral ground.” It is here that religious zealotry comfortably meets politics.

Many of those now charged with formulating policy matured intellectually within the milieu of the Cold War. Rumsfeld, Cheney, Wolfowitz, Powell, Rice, Armitage, etc. have for most of their lives known the only geopolitical game to be that between the Soviet Union, the United States, and to a more limited degree — and indeed only to the extent that the two superpowers allowed it enter into the game — China. Acts of terror were considered relatively low level forms of warfare, even less important strategically than limited and regional conflicts.<sup>14</sup>

Rice viewed the NSC as a ‘foreign policy’ coordination mechanism and not some place where issues such as terrorism in the U.S., or domestic preparedness for weapons of mass destruction, or computer network security should be addressed. I realized that Rice, and her deputy Steve Hadley, were still operating with the old Cold War paradigm from when they had worked on the NSC... neither of them had worked in the new post-Cold War security issues.<sup>15</sup>

For them, terrorism was a tactical response to power, not power itself, i.e., they believed that terror could not be a global strategy. Perhaps bin Laden understands the relation of the state to terror better than we think. It would seem reasonable to conclude that the triumphalist projection of force by the Bush administration is the result of the defeat of the Soviet Union; that the fall of the Soviets opened new horizons and initiated new forms of strategic planning and production. But it seems even more reasonable that their triumphalist politic is not forward looking, but nostalgic for an earlier, all too brief, period of American dominance, i.e., the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. We found ourselves then, too, without a major adversary and with what seemed a Divine Right to lead the free world. Our works in the world were to be rewarded, and our success could only come from the divine.<sup>16</sup> As Truman said, announcing the use of a weapon of mass destruction on Hiroshima, “God has given us the atom bomb and not our enemies.” But

current policy makers did not always appreciate that we cannot return to that idyllic time of a ruined Europe, a radioactive Pacific, and decrepit colonial regimes. The End of History was only the beginning of the era of terrorist war.<sup>17</sup>

For the ideologists of terror, the war on terror is being waged against a new kind of enemy bent on the destructive and evil goals of the communist enemy that preceded it. "Terrorists have taken leave of politics"<sup>18</sup> refers to more than conventional politics. Terrorists have taken leave of reason and civilized norms of behavior. This is why those who advocate a more pragmatic approach can be denounced as wrong headed or as offering consolation and understanding.

We could do everything demanded of us by those who are critical of America, both inside and outside our boundaries, but Islamist fundamentalism and the threat it poses would not be deterred... They loathe us because of who we are and what our society represents... our intellectuals, academics, and religious leaders... fail to take the measure of the terrible and difficult threats our society faces."<sup>19</sup>

And so is made the case for a Just War against terror. A Just War will serve our ends and, as we are the just, so too must be our wars. "The distinction is made between revenge and justice. Bush's 9.20.01 speech was about justice and had nothing to do with revenge."<sup>20</sup>

The religious origins of the concept of Just War are acknowledged, only to be immediately repressed. Augustine of Hippo placed the discussion within the Western tradition, we are told, and made it something unique to the West.<sup>21</sup> A Just War is a virtuous war, a war that is as much about political virtue as it is about personal virtue. The Just War is not only justifiable, but it is undertaken so as to put right the political order of the world and to restore its right to bestow virtue upon the world. Whereas Jihad contains within it the double meaning of offensive and defensive war, in the West the concepts are split apart into those of crusade and Just War. That both should have been deployed by the Bush administration within the first few days after September 11 suggests that either there was a conflict over which means to pursue, or that the gap between the two concepts is not so far apart as the ideologists of terror claim. Just War might well be a legalistic concept and crusade a religious one, but it would be better to think of Just War as a legal religious/political crusade and thus of a crusade as ideologically a Just War.

So it follows that the ideologists of terror would have such concern for the rationale for a Just War. It is their task to provide a rationale for this war. The discussion of what is or is not a good war takes place either during a long war, or long after the war is done, but always after hostilities have commenced. So it is that as the title suggests, the justification for the war on terror is that since terror is evil, a war on it is almost by definition a "Just War." The rationale for the war comes first, the definition of Just War comes at the end of the main chapters. Our "Coalition of the Willing" is nothing less than "the responsible enactor of justice."<sup>22</sup> This rather spiritualist rationale is counterpoised to the other literature of the apologists, which has little time for such moralizing; the best example of this other position being *Imperial Hubris* and, to some degree, *Lessons of Terror*.<sup>23</sup>

In addition to these works, there is the analysis produced by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, under the Chair of Strom Thurmond (R- S.C.). The 1984 report predates the politics of so many post 9-11 studies. The report uses events in Italy as a case-study in a much wider analysis of terrorism. First, it asserts that the presence of a terrorist threat had an important effect on political alliances and propaganda, including causing the trade union movement to become more moderate and supportive of the State. Second, and perhaps not surprising, that terror was in particular economically advantageous for security firms, construction trades, as well as media, and both popular and academic publishing. Third, that Italian terrorism of both the left and the right proved to be a failure if "its objective was and continues to be the radical uprooting of institutions... civil war is no where discernible on the horizon," but that considered as a tactic to "foster confusion, malaise, disunity, and social strife, then Italian terrorism can be regarded as moderately successful."<sup>24</sup> Fourth, no Bin Ladin-type figure is necessary, and is in fact often an illusionary presence. There is no "central figure or power center," no "grand old man" who dominates and coordinates specific actions. The terrorist leader serves both the state and its adversaries. The State gets to construct its enemy and the opponents of the State get a figure around whom they might recruit and call to for authority.

Logic would discount that a single person or entity can effectively perform the role of puppeteer of a phenomenon whose dimensions are as vast and diverse as those displayed by Italian terrorism from 1968 through 1982... [T]he example of Italy assumes a substantially more foreboding dimension not only in historic perspective but also with regard to potential future developments. In essence, this would mean that under given socio-political

tensions any group motivated by ideological considerations and bent on resorting to violence has the potential to become for an indefinite period of time a political player and dispenser of death.<sup>25</sup>

The political rhetoric which emerged in the wake of the events of 9.11.01 was neatly captured in the phrase “war on civilization.” We can easily find images and narratives identifying those charged with defending civilization against its enemies. There is a war against civilization and the West has always seen itself as the defender of civilization: one need only think of Marcus Aurelius spending the entire time he ruled Rome on the frontiers of the empire, defending Rome against the barbarians by day and writing the great work of Stoic philosophy at night. There was a war against civilization then, and there remains one today; but the modern war against civilization is not a war against Empire, but against the very embodiment of civilization: the City itself. The very persons who are presently touted as the defenders of civilization are in fact its most dangerous enemies.

Here we can see the fundamental contradiction in our response to 9.11.01. The present administration has chosen to defend civilization through the promotion of its religious antithesis. President Bush invoked the rhetoric of the Christian Holy War or Crusade. He said on September 14<sup>th</sup>, “This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while, come with us.” What is the difference between ridding the world of evildoers and ridding it of infidels and atheists? Is there really a difference between crusade and jihad? Perhaps, but jihad and crusade are identical in one important respect: both are invoked whenever religion seeks to subvert civilization. Consider the text of Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson’s conversation of September 13, 01:

“What we saw on Tuesday, as terrible as it is, could be minuscule if, in fact, God continues to lift the curtain and allow the enemies of America to give us probably what we deserve.”

[Mr. Robertson responded,] “Jerry, that’s my feeling. I think we’ve just seen the antechamber to terror. We haven’t even begun to see what they can do to the major population.”

[A few moments later Mr. Falwell said,] “The abortionists have got to bear some burden for this because God will not be mocked. And when we destroy 40 million little innocent babies, we make God mad. I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle, the A.C.L.U., People



for the American Way, all of them who have tried to secularize America, I point the finger in their face and say, 'You helped this happen.'"

[To which Mr. Robertson said,] "Well, I totally concur, and the problem is we have adopted that agenda at the highest levels of our government."

Pat Robertson issued a press release later saying:

We have insulted God at the highest level of our government. Then, we say, "Why does this happen?" It is happening because God Almighty is lifting His protection from us. Once that protection is gone, we are vulnerable because we are a free society... Think of the things in your life that are wrong. Think of the careless indifference. Think of the poor who you could have helped. Think of the Scripture you have ignored. Think of the time you should have been spending in prayer, when you were watching television or focusing on pornography or tuned into the Internet. Think of the things you have done in your own life and think of the indifference to the sin of this nation that you have just passed by and said, "Well, that is just the way it is. We have to have freedom." Think of it! ... We have sinned against Almighty God. At the highest level of government we have stuck our finger in Your eye. The Supreme Court has insulted You over and over again, Lord. They have taken Your Bible away from the schools. They have forbidden little children to pray. Organizations have gone to court to take the knowledge of God out of the public squares of America. Then people say, "Why isn't God looking after us."<sup>26</sup>

How far is this really from proclaiming as martyrs those who carried out attacks against the infidels? In its opposition to Enlightenment, religion seeks to make all of us the subjects of "good shepherds." Where it does allow the possibility of freedom, it is merely the freedom to be a slave without a master. And so it is not surprising to find that repression and resentment appear in the very origin of religion.

Enlightenment also has its own apparatus of power that organizes repression and resentment, but it has fundamentally different determinations. Enlightenment seeks the domination of Reason over Nature and faith, but it does not seek to nullify life in favor of a hereafter. This is key to understanding the civilizing drive shared by Bush, Bin Laden, and Sharon: religion always places something above Nature, and always seeks to denigrate life in

favor of a hereafter where you can be rewarded for whatever unconscionable acts you might perpetrate under the banner of faith, devotion, and civilization. At the same moment that he was sending tanks into Hebron on October 5, 2001, Sharon said that he was doing nothing more than “the work of enlightened civilization.” Perhaps religion appears enlightened at the very moment it most threatens enlightenment and so “...civilization leads back to the terror of Nature.”<sup>27</sup> Lucretius said that the origin of our willing obedience to authority lies in the terror that religion itself instills in us. Civilization has its terrors, too, but the power of religion is the fear that seeks to defend civilization by destroying it; but to defend civilization is to live a civilized life, which means that one must not betray civilization with the barbarities of retribution, revenge, and resentment: “...throughout history, the priest and the executioner have walked hand in hand.”<sup>28</sup>

We should not, however, dwell on the rhetoric and ideology of the administration and its allies. They pursue a bloody war and proclaim it to be a war of conflicting ideas. The irony of the debate on stem-cells — where the administration states its love of life and the sanctity of each potential individual life, at the same time it orders the destruction of cities and condones torture — should be obvious to even a casual observer. The longer the administration wages its war of ideas, the higher the corpses and the deeper the environmental degradation. Of the various justifications for the current war and of their inevitable claims of victory, there is little doubt that the ideology of the war is “an affirmation, a moral victory paid for by innumerable defeats, by abominable terrors, by abominable satisfactions. But it [is] a victory!”<sup>29</sup> We will have no choice but to return again and again to the statements of the administration, as its rhetoric returns to us again and again in everyday life. This is after all an administration that believes in everything and nothing: “We are an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality — judiciously as you will — we’ll act again, creating other new realities.”<sup>30</sup> There are and will be many fine dissections of the administration’s rhetoric, and so there is no need to repeat its rhetoric, except as necessary, because even its critique can become part of the ceaseless repetition of propaganda. So this essay will turn to some other considerations regarding terror in relation to the everyday.

## TERROR, ENLIGHTENMENT, AND REVOLUTION

Enlightenment carries with it the most advanced knowledge of terror. It is with the various forms of Enlightenment that the concept of terror becomes concrete and real — i.e., it moves from being a natural sign of divine wrath to being an institutional force — so that it can be universalized as a basis for World History. Terrorism is not a perversion of enlightenment, but integral to it — the act of terror makes the terrorist a “bringer of light,” whose claims are both real and also immediately questionable. There is in the act of terror the exercise of a kind of cold realism of force. Terror comes to manifest itself as a reversal or opposition to State power, even though we claim that terror is no longer a domain of the State, but of fanatics and anti-modernists. More chillingly, that terror cannot be contained within — or constrained by — the apparatus of State power. The more that it is “neutralized,” the more it is intensified, both within the State apparatus and outside of it in its opposition. Disclosure as openness — or transparency — becomes oblique repetition and the illusion of openness mystifies the intensification of tyranny. Consider the Padilla news conference of 6/2/04, where torture and the search for the simple truth about an organization is allied with a warning that any citizen can be stripped of their rights at any time.

We have decided to release this information to help people understand why we are doing what we’re doing in the war on terror and to help people understand the nature of the threat we face... Had we tried to make a case against Jose Padilla through our criminal justice system... he would very likely have followed his lawyer’s advice and said nothing, which would have been his constitutional right... I don’t believe that we could use this information in a criminal case, because we deprived him of access to his counsel and questioned him in the absence of counsel... [T]he questioning of Jose Padilla... was not undertaken to try and make a criminal case against Jose Padilla. It was done to find out the truth about what he knew about al Qaeda and threats to the United States.<sup>31</sup>

The State is after all known not only by its monopoly on the legitimate use of force, it is also known by its specific means of using physical force:

There is one transcendent advantage belonging to the province of the State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear and satisfactory light — I mean the ordinary administra-

tion of criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience and attachment. It is that which, being the immediate and visible guardian of life and property, having its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye, regulating all those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake, contributes, more than any other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of the people, affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government. This great cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the particular governments, independent of all other causes of influence, would insure them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not infrequently, dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.<sup>32</sup>

The “transcendent advantage” which the government enjoys is not something extraordinary, such as a charismatic leader, etc., but the “ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice” that is experienced in everyday life. This is not the experience of an abstract notion of law or nation, but rather the “ordinary administration” and regulation of individual desires, which impresses upon “the minds of the people affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government.” This great cement was itself not enough, though, because under the Articles of Confederation, administration was diffused through the various state governments; and so, not recognized by the citizens as the general rule of law, but seen as having its origin in the particular state government. The everyday manifestations of administration — its benefits and terrors — appeared as the force of the particular state, rather than of the Union. The justification for the law — the welfare of the populace — would be immediately clear; so, too, that the Rule of Law should come from those above.<sup>33</sup> The very legitimacy of the Federal government relied on its ability to appropriate these benefits and terrors and to then make them appear to derive from the Federal authority. It is no great insight to suggest that this conflict between state or local authority and Federal authority animated the revolutionary period (1760-1870) in the United States.

It is through revolution that terror comes to imbue both the natural and the social world. It was during the revolutionary period, both here and abroad, that social thought introduced into the natural world concepts which, once naturalized, would appear to guide the destiny of Nature and Man: evolution and revolution. Indeed, they were profoundly connected; and in the

years before Darwin, each created the possibility for the other. In evolution was placed the destiny of all things as all things were thought to exist already in the seed or the womb, they had only to unfold over time. The *homunculus* (the often described but imaginary miniature person encased in each sperm cell) should be remembered not as a curiosity of scientific error, but as a powerful representation of the orientation of scientific thought. Revolution was needed to explain changes in evolutionary movement, and especially the fact that fossils could no longer be explained away as mere mistakes or never completed inanimate copies of prefigurative forms, but evidence of extinction and upheavals — revolutions — of the earth.<sup>34</sup>

The terrible beauty of nature becomes celebrated as its “savage nobility.” Beauty was always a consideration in the scientific classification of humans,<sup>35</sup> and with the predominant polygenic theory, each species of human was assigned a specific geographical/ecological locale with appropriate and exclusive varieties of flora and fauna.<sup>36</sup> When Robespierre spoke of absolving “providence from the long reign of crime and tyranny,” everyone understood what was meant. The socialists of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century were no less fierce in their quest for social hygiene and development than were the eugenicists and the followers of Spencer. The overturning of the established order and its subsequent extinction, the founding of a new order in a world cleansed of the accumulated past — a new year zero — complemented each other and the new study of life founded within its midst. To Cuvier, revolutions of the Earth were evidence of a wrathful deity and vice versa. In social life, revolution would be forged by linking terror and virtue,<sup>37</sup> for the transformation of the earth itself is the true revolution in human life. “We want, in a word, to fulfill nature’s desires, accomplish the destiny of humanity, keep the promises of philosophy, absolve providence from the long reign of crime and tyranny. Now what is the fundamental principle of popular or democratic government... It is virtue.”<sup>38</sup> It was the desire for virtue that justifies the present.

“What,” asks Robespierre in his speech on the principles of public morals...“is the fundamental principle of democratic or popular government? It is virtue, I mean public virtue, which worked such miracles in Greece and Rome and which will work still greater ones in Republican France; virtue which is nothing but love of one’s country and its laws.”<sup>39</sup>

Revolution is impossible without virtue and terror is the instrument of the virtuous Republic, its defense against tyranny and degeneration. The revo-

lution creates what it bestows, and its authority derives from state terror and the benefits of government. What was accomplished was revolutionary insofar as it brought about new virtues and new terrors and left behind the old for the new era of “emancipated slavery, bourgeois society.” With the creation of public virtue, virtue becomes “nothing but love of one’s country and its laws.” Virtue is meant now as more than the mere patriotic obedience to the people and the source of law, but it has another equally important principle: the principle of terror. Public virtue and public terror are — at least during the revolutionary period, a period that is permanently present — the mainsprings of popular government. “The first maxim” is “to lead the people by reason and the people’s enemies by terror.” Virtue and reason would work to “excite love of country, to purify morals, to elevate souls, to direct the passions of the human heart toward the public interest...” The work of the new republic is to identify and rid itself of “that which is immoral, impolitic,” because “that which is corrupting” is counterrevolutionary.<sup>40</sup> Weakness, vice, and prejudices are counterrevolutionary. Reason leads, purifies and defends the republic from corruption and degeneracy, and terror works with it to accomplish the same result. Terror also marks democratic institutions. “Virtue must rule through terror.”<sup>41</sup> Robespierre gave this premise full recognition in his address to the Convention of Feb. 5, 1794:

We must smother the internal and external enemies of the Republic or perish with them. Now, in this situation, the first maxim of your policy ought to be to lead the people by reason and the people’s enemies by terror.

If the mainspring of popular government in peacetime is virtue, amid revolution it is at the same time [both] virtue and terror: virtue, without which terror is fatal; terror, without which virtue is impotent. Terror is nothing but prompt, severe, inflexible justice; it is therefore an emanation of virtue. It is less a special principle than a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to our country’s most pressing needs.

It has been said that terror was the mainspring of despotic government. Does your government, then, resemble a despotism? Yes, as the sword which glitters in the hands of liberty’s heroes resembles the one with which tyranny’s lackeys are armed. Let the despot govern his brutalized subjects by terror; he is right to do this, as a despot. Subdue liberty’s enemies by terror, and you will be right, as founders of the Republic. The government of the revolution is the despotism of liberty against tyranny. Is force made

only to protect crime? And is it not to strike the heads of the proud that lightning is destined?

The parallels between the speeches of Robespierre and Trotsky's *Communism and Terrorism* are obvious to most readers. The difference between Robespierre and Trotsky is that, for the former, terror was necessary for the functioning of the Republic, and for Trotsky, terror was only necessary for the revolution or the revolutionary period. But in a world defined, as Cuvier and Lyell also suggested, as always in a revolutionary period, terror becomes an aspect of permanent revolution. Even in revolutionary struggle there is the repetition of the same political process over and over again.<sup>42</sup>

The more powerful a state and hence the more political a nation, the less inclined it is to explain the general principle governing social ills and to seek out their causes by looking at the principle of the state — i.e., at the actual organization of society of which the state is the active, self-conscious and official expression. Political understanding is just political understanding because its thought does not transcend the limits of politics. The sharper and livelier it is, the more incapable is it of comprehending social problems. The classical period of political understanding is the French Revolution. Far from identifying the principle of the state as the source of social ills, the heroes of the French Revolution held social ills to be the source of political problems. Thus Robespierre regarded great wealth and great poverty as an obstacle to pure democracy. He therefore wished to establish a universal system of Spartan frugality. The principle of politics is the will. The more one-sided — i.e., the more perfect — political understanding is, the more completely it puts its faith in the omnipotence of the will, the blinder it is towards the natural and spiritual limitations of the will, the more incapable it becomes of discovering the real source of the evils of society.<sup>43</sup>

When Lucretius warned against the fear of death instilled in religion, he could not know that a secular religion could produce a “truth as one and the same in its mutually complementary manifestations, i.e., in the state, in nature, and in the ideal world.”<sup>44</sup> The fear of death still carries its force, but this force now serves the state. We repress the certainty that we all live in a city without walls. Subtly, the war on terror is a war for permanence of fear — a war without end — for it is fear that drives the apparatus of force, which reproduces and condones its use against the populace. Torture becomes a particular instance of a general terror whose purpose is not merely to extract

information but to create a specter of punishment. As a fictional soon-to-be victim asks when introduced to his well-mannered and cultured interrogator/torturer, "What do you want?" and receives the reply, "Why, you... of course!"<sup>45</sup>

## **TERROR AND THE WORKING DAY**

The question was once asked whether Marx saw all of society as a vast factory, that "Ideal Workhouse... the House of Terror?" It is clear that Marx understood the factory and practical daily life as extensions of each other. In other words, terror and the everyday are already present in not only the State, but in civil society and in everyday life. The creation of the "official, economic form" of bourgeois "enjoyment"<sup>46</sup> — "luxury" and the expansion of pleasure to first the aristocracy and then the working classes "shattered the basis of all morality, whether the morality of asceticism or of enjoyment." Materialism had to be built anew and it had to be created in relation to this new form of enjoyment, whose real and full shape lay in the future, since even the most advanced societies had only just begun to discover luxury and extend its enjoyment beyond the province of the bourgeois social classes.<sup>47</sup>

The production of pleasure within the working day allows the expansion of luxury along with the extension of the working day. A general lack of concern with the morality of the workers (at least at first) follows the destruction of old modes of asceticism. The extension of morality along with luxury crystallizes the contradiction between work and leisure. The extension of the working day and the work of leisure becomes the everyday quest for luxury — the luxury of leisure — but also the daily terror of the factory. Now this discussion also leads into a discussion of species, and perhaps more importantly, for the consideration of the everyday, the distinction drawn by "Sancho" between the "human and the inhuman."<sup>48</sup> Society has always developed within "the framework of a contradiction," but the contradiction between the human and the inhuman is neither a contradiction or essential — "so-called inhuman is just as much a product of present day relations as the human is ... the positive expression, 'human' corresponds to the definite relations that predominate just as the negative expression in 'inhuman' corresponds to the attempt to negate these predominant relations and the way of satisfying needs prevailing under them without changing the existing mode of production, an attempt that this stage of production daily engenders afresh."<sup>49</sup>



The repetitious production of the predominant relations and the satisfaction of the corresponding needs is the production of the everyday. When we pause in our well meant and virtuous attempts to celebrate the resistance of the everyday and of popular culture, we must also admit that this resistance is slightly less than the overwhelming force of accumulation and terror. We hear and delight in the laugh of resistance and the praise of the popular, but underneath it all the repetition of the lash remains.

Sometimes you may hear a wild, hoarse laugh arise from a circle, and often a song. Soon, however, the overseer comes dashing through the field. "Tumble up! Tumble up, and to work, work," is the cry; and, now, from twelve o'clock (mid-day) till dark, the human cattle are in motion, wielding their clumsy hoes; hurried on by no hope of reward, no sense of gratitude, no love of children, no prospect of bettering their condition; nothing, save the dread and terror of the slave-driver's lash. So goes one day, and so comes and goes another.<sup>50</sup>

This daily renewal of structures and needs is the living moment of capital that weighs so heavily on the minds of the living. If the contradiction of our time is between the human and the inhuman, life and non-life, it rests on the everyday accumulation of the artifacts of everyday life. Capital still contains its own irreconcilable contradictions.

But our populace have adopted a notion, that as Englishmen they enjoy a birthright privilege of being more free and independent than in any country in Europe... "The cure will not be perfect, till our manufacturing poor are contented to labour six days for the same sum which they now earn in four days." To this end, and for "extirpating idleness debauchery and excess," promoting a spirit of industry, "lowering the price of labour in our manufactories, and easing the lands of the heavy burden of poor's rates," our "faithful Eckart" of capital proposes this approved device: to shut up such labourers as become dependent on public support, in a word, paupers, in "an ideal workhouse." Such ideal workhouse must be made a "House of Terror," and not an asylum for the poor, "where they are to be plentifully fed, warmly and decently clothed, and where they do but little work." In this "House of Terror," this "ideal workhouse, the poor shall work 14 hours in a day, allowing proper time for meals, in such manner that there shall remain 12 hours of neat-labour."<sup>51</sup>

It was the anonymous author and apologist for the extension of the working day, and not Marx, who placed the ideal of workhouse as the main gear in the mechanism of daily renewal.<sup>52</sup> “[T]he Ideal Workhouse, in the ‘House of Terror’ ... for paupers which the capitalistic soul of 1770 only dreamed, was realised a few years later in the shape of a gigantic ‘Workhouse’ for the industrial worker himself. It is called the Factory. And the ideal this time fades before the reality.”<sup>53</sup> The Houses of Terror would train and produce a docile worker. The factory was the Ideal Workhouse of the rising bourgeoisie and as the rising class, their “ideas” were already being made real in the world before their thoughts were put to pen. The factory is the realization of the dream of the Ideal Workhouse, and with it, the space for the realization of the ideal working day transformed into everyday life. Often it seems that an underlying, almost unspoken belief is that everyday life is modern, while exploitation was a thing of the past: that a break exists between the present and the disciplinary society, and with this break, the critiques that emerged from within the disciplinary society are equally discourses of the past. The deployment of the concept of the everyday is said to represent a great rupture and the start of a new age. In the heads of everyday thinkers the everyday is a wholly revolutionary space. Would that this space extended beyond the limits of their own crania.

How far is the “hoarse laugh” and song from *The Factory Song*?<sup>54</sup> We do not need to be in the factory anymore. We do not need the policeman hovering over us. They and a host of other demigods have already been internalized. The ideal workhouse was never a particular factory, but the social relations of the factory writ large in everyday life. The factory, the police, and the state are as much a part of everyday life as are the movements of counter-terrorism. It is the “subtle establishment of terror in the popular consciousness,”<sup>55</sup> which reminds us that “the reign of terror is the rule of terrorized people.”<sup>56</sup>

## TERROR AND EVERYDAY LIFE

Contemporary theorists of terror belong to no one ideological camp, but are often profoundly conservative. Typically, terror is for them a weapon of the State and an adjunct to virtue. The significance of this historical link between the State and virtue is lost amid the constant repetition of the ideology that terror is outside and against the State. Virtue, and by this is meant the creation of a virtuous state and a virtuous people, is also set ideologically against terror; but ideology can never disguise the strong affinity between terror and virtue, just as politics has yet to overcome the affinity

between the State and the People. Terror remains a weapon of the state and an adjunct to virtue, and it is now *defined* as something outside of the state. The State is no longer considered virtuous merely because it deploys terror, it is now virtuous because it deploys terror in defense of its terrorized citizens. It does this in order to assure its own virtue and that of its citizens through their fear. It is not so surprising that the sanctioning of torture was done in the name of protecting civil liberties, for when hasn't "mankind been kept alive by bestial acts?"<sup>57</sup>

The everyday is lived as a double illusion, "that of limpidity and evidence ('that's how it is') and that of substantial reality ('it could not be any different'); thus the illusion of immediacy in everyday life is defined."<sup>58</sup> This discovery has been made before, but it is a truism that must be repeated daily because, on the one hand, it partakes of the rhythms of the moment and, on the other hand, because its power ebbs and flows with the experience of everyday life. The memory of the double illusion of everyday life is difficult to maintain, because to remember it puts the lie to the immediate reality of the everyday. "I know the world I converse with in the city and in the farms is not the world I think. I observe that difference and shall observe it."<sup>59</sup> But this is a terrifying stance to assume.

The experience of everyday life does not accumulate. Even the cruelest blow must be repeated over and over, else it becomes lost to memory amid the repetitions and limits of everyday life. For Emerson, the death of his child was just such an unimaginable blow, but over time, in the course of everyday routines and fantasies, even that pain receded. So, he asked what can be learned from experience? And answers that experience must be repeated, if it is to remain in memory. Else it becomes only a trace of the fear of death and this fear of death becomes the fear of the living world.

Everyday life, like the experiences that comprise it, is not cumulative: everyday life and its terror must be constantly produced. "Where experience is concerned, everyday life is wasted."<sup>60</sup> Terror must be active and relentless in order to make daily life repeatable. "This world is a place of business. What an infinite bustle! I am awakened almost every night by the panting of the locomotive. It interrupts my dreams. There is no Sabbath. It would be glorious to see mankind at leisure for once. It is nothing but work, work, work."<sup>61</sup> The narratives of individuals give the illusion of coherence to the succession of everyday experience. "The secret of the illusoriness is the necessity of a succession of moods or objects... I am a fragment and this is a fragment of me."<sup>62</sup> Precisely because everyday life does not accumulate,

it can become a primary space of crisis, and so the succession must be repeated daily.

It might be objected that the inability of everyday life to accumulate makes it a privileged space of resistance to the social relations of capital, but this is one-sided. The “double illusion of everyday life” and of the “cynical individual of experience,” who denies both the illusion and their own cynicism, mark the connection between the cynical individual of experience and the processes of global capital. The refusal to believe “experience and to take it into account” is not forced upon us; it “is typical of terrorist society” that we force it upon ourselves, for everyday life is terrorized life.

The State has never given up its monopoly of power and violence. The judicial meaning of physical force takes shape only within a state. The essence of the state remains the definition and the control of the means of force. That the recognition of the violence inherent in the system has shifted to the enemies of the state in no way alters the state’s monopoly on violence. The state would seem to wither away, although this withering is only an indication of the degree to which power and violence have been internalized. Part of the double-illusion of everyday life is the belief that the state is less important and that the racialized sense of a politics of a people or a community becomes overtly dominant. But the tendency of the State to continue and even expand its rationalization of power through administration and knowledge — at the very moment when globalization, identity, and the everyday are supposedly overwhelming it, constraining it, or transforming it — speaks volumes about the needs of the present and the probable course of events in the near future; within the circuit of the production of the everyday, i.e., “the everyday administration of criminal and civil law, the benefits and terrors”<sup>63</sup> which unite State violence and everyday terror. That this apparatus is made possible by reason and discipline was a key insight of Critical Theory — one that gives even its most vociferous detractors pause.

The weight of accumulated culture and the rapid laying down of new strata by the culture industry seems relentless and immediate, but so too is the repetition of culture — without which the structure of accumulation would collapse. An open question remains whether the moment of crisis is to be found in the interstice between accumulation and the everyday. How might that crisis appear when it is not seen as a crisis of class struggle, but of cultural, communal, or racial struggle — which often overlap. To see the world through the lens of race is not a feature reserved for the far right. The

embrace, by some, of identity and community is due in no small measure to the allure of the irrational that some tendencies on the left, who — failing to understand the difference between class struggle and racial struggle — dismiss class identity or seek to replace it with a politics of community. The proletariat is the dream and projection of the party, but so are identities nothing more or less than the dreams and projections of the ideologists of the community and the people. “America is said to be the arena on which the battle of freedom is to be fought, but surely it cannot be freedom in a merely political sense that is meant. Even if we grant that the American has freed himself from a political tyrant, he is still the slave of an economic and moral tyrant.”<sup>64</sup>

If the experience of the everyday is neither cumulative nor capable of accumulation, the residue of the everyday social relations of real active beings does accumulate and two of the provinces for this accumulation are militarism and writing. Leaving aside militarism for another time,<sup>65</sup> writing deserves the special attention it has received because it is the means by which memory accumulates. We are often given — because reality forces us to adopt this view — to think only of the everyday as a domain of crisis and resistance in the production of capital; but the everyday accumulates through writing, not only in the writing of institutions but also the writing of the record of experience. Experience, then, only accumulates through writing. As experience is never far from violence, so too is the accumulation of experience linked to the implicit terror of everyday life. To the degree that the everyday is repetition and constant remembering and repression, writing allows a return, a fixing of time, a record of social actions.

From this new angle, presented by a sociology of terrorism and written matter, bureaucracy’s propensity to found its power on the written word leaves little doubt. The power of the written word knows no restraint, and bureaucratic skill, knowledge and rationality, founded as they are on written matter, infiltrate every detail of administration. The state replaces providence; bureaucracy, with the technical support of computers, supplants and incarnates the Lord; in this form of government where everyday life is totally organized nothing escapes or can escape organization... Such is the terrorist society, where each individual trembles lest he ignore the Law but thinks only of turning it to his advantage by laying blame on someone else.<sup>66</sup>

The violence of writing and the right to terrorize are inherent in the experience of the administration of everyday justice has been noted before.<sup>67</sup>

The writing of the sentence has a much to do with the act and apparatus of writing — institutions — as it does with the execution of the condemned. Kafka's *Penal Colony* marked a transformation of the everyday. No longer are enclosures and executions — deliberate communities and displays of state violence — necessary for correcting the middle classes. The harrow was the machine of the disciplinary society, a machine that wrote the crime on the body of the offender: obey authority.<sup>68</sup> The necessity to create a social animal, one that can assume rights and obligations, could be satisfied through the spectacle of direct application of force. The apparatus crystallized the two sides of writing: the power of the state, made manifest through violence and bureaucracy; and the power to name, which runs from the power to name the crime to the power to name the species. Writing has not lost its place in the transformation from a disciplinary society. The explorer, after all, is preparing a report on the status of the apparatus. "Thus our life is not altogether a forgetting, but also, alas! To a great extent, a remembering, of that which we should never have been conscious of, certainly not in our waking hours."<sup>69</sup>

Under the regime of discipline, writing was about violence — represented by the apparatus of the *Penal Colony*; but now writing is no longer joined to power by the writing of the History of the State — a role that the discipline of history still clings to, even when historians have long since been replaced by committee staffs and agencies — but through the everyday. A radical history which attempts to make the history of the unrepresented, the silenced, the marginal, etc. intelligible as history proper was a noble idea, but it also makes the everyday available to writing. Giving voice to those whose voices could not be mediated by traditional history at once freed the expressions and counter-histories that had never been granted recognition. And the desire to be granted recognition — or to serve up the silent or wretched knowledges for recognition — recognizes the superiority of the force that can grant recognition. This recognition allows the everyday to be intelligible to the State, and so in some small way made possible the constellation of writing, terror, and the everyday. So too does this turn necessitate that we take as the object of our critique not only the historical apparatus of writing and violence, but the present apparatus of terror and the everyday.

It should not be forgotten that there is an inherent connection between global capital and everyday experience — an experience which can only be communicated cynically: "Now that my horrific experience of terror is over, how about some breakfast?"<sup>70</sup>

## COUNTER-TERRORISM

As terrorism appears to move from the domain of State power to that of everyday experience, the actual movement is less a shift than it is the intensification of the everyday terrorism that comes with the consolidation of state power. The motifs of everyday life are now established and repeatedly affirmed: violence and subjectification, the use of torture to establish truth — a truth which comes with the inevitable result that what was briefly considered barbaric is now the trusted defender of the state in the face of its own circumscription by globalized capital. The prisoners must now speak their crime rather than merely recognize it. “They participate in their own torture because they expect to be tortured.”<sup>71</sup> What is jarring about this is not that a civilized society condones torture, but that torture is now affirmed as civilized. Torture is justified as a defensive measure for democracy, but there is a difference in how torture and truth are now allied with each other. No longer are torture and terror both understood as mindless, and no longer is the response to each judicial. Torture and terror are seen by all as being allied with truth; and so, its use by anyone justifies its use by all. That democracy should be defended by torture affirms, though the “subtle establishment of terror,” the ideology that the enemy is so barbaric that torture is the only rational response to the capture of a vanquished enemy. We are left with the intensification of everyday terror and state power at the same moment that state control is being circumscribed by the relations of globalized capital.

Critical theory was a response to the transformations of capital accumulation and relations between administration and knowledge. These transformations called for a critique of the basis of the left as well as of the dominant classes; and so, Critical Theory undertook the task which Marx described as “the ruthless critique of all existing things.” In the endless commentaries and exegesis on Critical Theory, this general critique is often acknowledged, only to be forgotten in the tiresome exercise of academic argumentation. The study of fascism was a specific project of Critical Theory. It was a part of a much larger project on authority in the social relations of capital. Given the transformations which resulted in consumerism and mass-produced popular culture, the project on authority had also to address the everyday relations of authority, and fascism presented it as stark reality. But this and other specific studies were never projected to be the central work of critical theory. The work on fascism was undertaken due to the “vicissitudes of human fate... above all concerned with phenomena that can only be understood in the context of human social life ...”<sup>72</sup> If the central concern was

authority in contemporary life, then the obvious object of analysis was the relation of fascism and reason. Given this, it would seem that the transformation to new forms of control would warrant a similar shift in critical analysis. Unfortunately, while the object shifted from fascism and reason to the everyday and knowledge, Critical Theory became mired in what has been referred to as a “dialectics of defeatism.”

Critical theory appears stagnant because it is seen in terms of only two narratives, “in the first, the city is never left, in the second, it is never reached.” First, critical theory did not originate or remain with one school, not even with Marx. The limit of Critical Theory is nothing less than “the entire material and intellectual culture of humanity.”<sup>73</sup> The second tendency neglects to note that Critical Theory is premised on change and indeterminacy. The city and its spaces change with or without our personal comings and goings. “Life as it is lived” includes the vicissitudes of life that regulate “... the connection between the economic life of society, the psychological development of individuals, and the change in the realm of culture in the narrow sense (to which belong not only the so called intellectual elements, such as science, art, and religion, but also customs, fashion, public opinion, sports, leisure activities, lifestyle, etc.).”<sup>74</sup> Critical theory is useful only in so far as it is “capable of giving particular studies animating impulses” and “remains open enough to let itself be influenced and changed by these concrete studies.”<sup>75</sup> The debates over critical theory have done little to advance the analysis of “life as it is lived,” but have done much to establish the defeatist ideology that critical theory has an orthodoxy. Reduced to only this historical debate, we forget that even as terror has come to *represent* opposition to the state, the number of terrorist acts is miniscule alongside the power of the state to make the everyday embody its truth through the deployment of terror. “[Enlightenment] spirit is hostile to authority only when authority lacks the strength to enforce obedience, and to violence only when violence is not an established fact... After a brief interlude of liberalism in which the bourgeois kept one another in check, power is revealing itself as archaic terror in a fascistically rationalized form ‘the religious chimeras’ must be replaced by utmost terror... as a final result, civilization leads back to the terror of Nature.”<sup>76</sup>

Virtue, terror, the everyday, experience, writing, accumulation and revolution constitute nodal points in the discourse on civilization and terrorist society. That these all find expression in politics is testament to the elasticity of meaning and to their penetration into the farthest corners of the globe.<sup>77</sup> The city is the space for the struggle against terror, for a new kind of counter-



terrorism. In the everyday media, this phrase means the struggle against Islamists; but, critically speaking, counter-terrorism is the struggle against the terror of the everyday and the imposition of a virtuous republic. Counter-terrorism is not negative:

The negative, the tearing down, can be decreed, but not the positive, the building up. New territory. A thousand-and-one problems. Only experience is capable of correcting and of opening up new forms and improvisations, illuminates creative forces, and corrects all blunders itself. The only way to a rebirth is in the school of public life itself, the broadest and most unlimited democracy, and public opinion. It is rule by Terror that demoralizes.<sup>78</sup>

The city has always been the site of both civilization and of a fearsome immorality directed against those spaces and mores outside of the urban *genre de vie*. The city serves as the space where social contradictions remain unresolved except by the passage of time. Rule by terror demoralizes. It strips the cosmopolitan city of its morality by making everywhere the same: "We are all New Yorkers now." There are, of course, many cities, as many as can be produced by the cognitive maps that arrange our comings and goings, through its spaces. The possibilities are still no less than the despair. There was an old saying in Rome that "Man is a wolf to men,"<sup>79</sup> which has as many meanings as a Sufi teaching story. Wolf's and Wolfowitz's now have spaces in the city, spaces like ground zero and city hall. There is little point in working to make these spaces better or more representative. "Revolution, after all, is never made by a party..."<sup>80</sup> New cities already exist within the borders of the terrorist society. Even with Critical Theory, there remains the possibility of something different — the promise that "Human nature, essentially changeable, unstable as the dust, can endure no restraint; if it binds itself it soon begins to tear madly at its bonds, until it rends everything asunder, the wall, the bonds, and its very self."<sup>81</sup> It would be at this moment that one might hear in a human's hoarse laugh: "Let me look back upon thee. O thou wall that girdlest in those wolves."<sup>82</sup>

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Terrorism: The systematic use of terror esp as a means of coercion. In Caesar terror is always associated with battle, and specifically, with flight from battle. *De bello gallico* (*Gallic Wars*) Terror: ME fr. MF *terreur*, fr. L. *terror*, fr. *terrere* to frighten, akin to Gk. *trein* to be afraid, flee, tremain to tremble. Webster's *New Collegiate Latin* *tremo*, to tremble, quake, shiver inf to tremble or fear to do, also c. acc. to tremble at, fear. But the Latin *terror*, from which our own word is derived, is not so much about an action, i.e., to flee (in terror of), but more to cause or produce in another. Leverett's *Magnum Totius Latinitatis Lexicon* [abridgment of Facciolati and Forcellini](1844) gives the possible parallels to the Greek *phobos*.
- <sup>2</sup> Thucydides. 1954. *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. by Rex Werner. New York, Penguin Classics, 13.
- <sup>3</sup> Thucydides. *The Peloponnesian War*, 13.
- <sup>4</sup> William S. Burroughs. 1989. "No More Stalins, No More Hitlers," from *Dead City Radio*, Island Records, 1990.
- <sup>5</sup> Bertolt Brecht and Kurt Weil, *What Keeps Mankind Alive*
- <sup>6</sup> Caleb Carr. 2002. *Lessons of Terror: a History of Warfare against Civilians*, 2nd ed. New York, Random House.
- <sup>7</sup> Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. 2002[1946]. *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*. Stanford University Press, 93.
- <sup>8</sup> Perhaps the only exception was Lyndon Johnson's "War on Poverty."
- <sup>9</sup> Jean Bethke Elshtain. 2003. *Just War Against Terror: the Burden of American Power in a Violent World*. New York, Basic Books.
- <sup>10</sup> Georg Buchner, "Danton's Death" in Henry J. Schmidt, trans. and ed. 1977. *Georg Buchner: The Complete Collected Works*. (New York: Avon), 27-29.
- <sup>11</sup> Murray Edelman. 1987. *Constructing the Political Spectacle*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- <sup>12</sup> David Byrne. 1997. "The Civil Wars" from *Feelings*.
- <sup>13</sup> George W. Bush 23 September, 2003 BBC *Worldservice*, [www.bbc.uk.com](http://www.bbc.uk.com)
- <sup>14</sup> Gearoid O Tuathail [Gerard Toal]. 1996. *Critical Geopolitics: the Politics of Writing Global Space*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, *Borderlines*, Vol. 6.
- <sup>15</sup> Richard Clarke. 2003. *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror*. New York: Free Press, 230.
- <sup>16</sup> "Protestantism, by changing almost all the traditional holidays into workdays, plays an important part in the genesis of capital." Marx, *Capital*; and also Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.
- <sup>17</sup> "I'm talking nuclear war/ it's going to fuck you up/ when they push that button/ drop that nuclear bomb." Sun Ra Arkestra, *Nuclear War*
- <sup>18</sup> Elshtain, *Just War Against Terror*, 19.

- <sup>19</sup> Elshtain, *Just War Against Terror*, 3-5.
- <sup>20</sup> Elshtain, *Just War Against Terror*, 14.
- <sup>21</sup> "...the criteria for a justified war...: A. A war must be a response to an act of aggression or the threat of such B. A war must be openly declared. C. A war must begin with the right intention. St. Augustine described this as the intention to a more just, hence, peaceful, world. D. A war should be a last resort after other options have been considered seriously. Other measures need not have been tried, in turn, but they must have been considered." *Elshtain, Just War Against Terror*, 184.
- <sup>22</sup> Elshtain, *Just War Against Terror*, 25.
- <sup>23</sup> Anonymous, after having followed bin Ladin since the start of the Afghan War, countered in *Imperial Hubris* by describing bin Ladin in particular as having no interest in such things. It is Carr's further contention that there have never really been non-combatants. Terrorists are soldiers, and implicitly, civilians are combatants, as well; the space between the indiscriminate killing of one's enemies is simply one of politics, as politics is only a continuation of war by other means.
- <sup>24</sup> *Terrorism and Security: the Italian Experience*. Report of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, 98<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2d Session, S. Prt. 98-246, November 1984. United States Government Printing Office, Washington 1984 (GAO Doc. n. 36-679 O), 59.
- <sup>25</sup> *Terrorism and Security: the Italian Experience*, 59.
- <sup>26</sup> *New York Times*, and also available from PatRobertson.com
- <sup>27</sup> Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 80.
- <sup>28</sup> Michael Wood. 1983. *In Search of the Trojan War*. PBS and BBC Channel 4.
- <sup>29</sup> Joseph Conrad. 1969. *Heart of Darkness*, ed. by Franklin Walker in *Heart of Darkness and the Secret Sharer: the Complete Texts & a Comprehensive Study Supplement*
- <sup>30</sup> Ron Suskind, "Without a Doubt: Faith, Certainty, and the Presidency of George W. Bush." *New York Times Magazine*, October 17, 2004.
- <sup>31</sup> U.S. Deputy Attorney General James Comey Transcript of news conference on Jose Padilla Tuesday, June 1, 2004 <http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/01/comey.padilla.transcript/> Comey's entire presentation can be summarized as "We are a free and open society, and that is why we have so many secrets."
- <sup>32</sup> *Federalist No. 17* [Alexander Hamilton] Tuesday, December 4, 1787. "The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union" for the *Independent Journal*.
- <sup>33</sup> Hannah Arendt. 1987. *On Revolution*. New York: Penguin Books.
- <sup>34</sup> Georges Cuvier. 1825. *Discourse on the Revolutionary Upheavals on the Surface of the Globe and the Changes which they have Produced in the Animal Kingdom*. Paris.
- <sup>35</sup> Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. 1795. *De Generis Humani Varietate Nativa*. London.
- <sup>36</sup> Louis Agassiz in Josiah Nott and George Gliddon. 1852. *Types of Mankind*. Philadelphia.

37 Revolution and rebirth — permanent revolution is a concept that can be found in Cuvier: just as revolutions happened in the past, so too will they happen in the future. Cuvier preserves both the apocalypse and the creation along with the biblical chronology. At the same time, he makes possible the concept that animates Lyell's *Principles of Geology*; namely, that the processes we can identify in the past are slow, gradual, and most importantly, for Lyell and Darwin, still happening all around us.

38 Cuvier *Discourse on the Revolutionary Upheavals*

39 "What a terrible illusion it is to have to recognise and sanction in the rights of man modern bourgeois society, the society of industry, of universal competition, of private interest freely pursuing its aims, of anarchy, of self-estranged natural and spiritual individuality, and at the same time to want afterwards to annul the manifestations of the life of this society in particular individuals and simultaneously to want to model the political head of that society in the manner of antiquity!" Karl Marx (with Frederick Engels). 1975 [1844]. *The Holy Family, or the Critique of Critical Criticism*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 150.

40 "Frightened by 'the rushing torrent of the examples' we have set, they very quietly seek to cool down our justice... Calm yourselves, virtuous people, calm yourselves, patriots: tell your brothers in Lyons that 'the sword justice will not rust in the hands of those to whom you have entrusted it. We will set a great example for the Republic.' (General applause.)" Georg Buchner, *Danton's Death*, 29.

41 Georg Buchner, *Danton's Death*, 28.

42 "...the old fancy that the state collapses of itself as soon as all its members leave it and that money loses its validity if all workers refuse to accept it... This proposition reveals all the fantasy and impotence of pious desire. It is the old illusion that changing existing relations depends only on the good will of the people, and that existing relations are ideas. The alteration of consciousness divorced from actual relations — a pursuit followed by philosophers as a profession, i.e., as a business — is itself a product of existing relations and inseparable from them. This imaginary rising above the world is the ideological expression of philosophers in the face of the world. Practical life everyday gives the lie to their ideological bragging." Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. 1848. *The German Ideology*, from *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 5. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 379.

43 Karl Marx. 1844. "Critical Notes on the Article 'The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian,'" *Vorwärts!*, No.63, August 7 1844.

44 "In the state, self-consciousness finds in an organic development the actuality of its substantive knowing and willing; in religion, it finds the feeling and the representation of its own truth as an ideal essentiality; while in philosophic science, it finds free comprehension and knowledge of its truth as one and the same in its mutually complementary manifestations, i.e., in the state, in nature, and in the ideal world." Georg Hegel. 1952 [1821]. *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, translated with notes by T.M. Knox. New York: Oxford University Press, 222-224.

45 *Star Trek: Next Generation*. 1992. "Chain of Command, parts I and II. Episodes 236 and 237.

46 Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 418-419.

47 "The present crude form of proletarian pleasure is due, on the one hand, to the long working hours, which led to the utmost intensification of the need of enjoyment, and, on the other hand, to the restriction — both qualitative and quantitative — of the means of pleasure accessible to the proletariat." Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 418 [crossed-out passage]

48 "In *Don Quixote* he [Marx] saw the epic of dying-out chivalry whose virtues were ridiculed and scoffed at in the emerging bourgeois world." Paul Lafargue, [www.marxarchive.org](http://www.marxarchive.org)

49 Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 432.

- 50 Frederick Douglass. 1855. *Life and Times of Frederick Douglass* <http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/>
- 51 Marx *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol 1*. New York: Penguin Classics, 95.
- 52 "Among the accusers of the workpeople, the most angry is the anonymous author quoted in the text of *An Essay on Trade and Commerce, containing Observations on Taxes, &c.*, London, 1770. He had already dealt with this subject in his earlier work: *Considerations on Taxes*. London, 1765. On the same side follows Polonius Arthur Young, the unutterable statistical prattler." Marx, *Capital*, footnote 89. See also the chapter "Greed for Surplus Value" in *Capital*.
- 53 Marx, *Capital*, 95.
- 54 "Work, Work, Work; here comes another one now, here comes another one now..." Fred Frith and Tom Cora *Factory Song*.
- 55 Carr, *Lessons of Terror*, 270.
- 56 Engels, letter to Marx, September 4, 1870, [http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1870/letters/70\\_09\\_04.htm](http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1870/letters/70_09_04.htm)
- 57 Kurt Weil, "What Keeps Mankind Alive"
- 58 Henri Lefebvre. 1971. *Everyday Life in the Modern World*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 187.
- 59 Ralph Waldo Emerson. 1890. "Experience" from *Essays, Second Series*. Philadelphia: David McKay. Emerson argues in part that everything is surface, illusion, etc., and there is no order to these things save that which experience imposes upon nature in order to make sense of its complexity. This experience must be itself constantly renewed, in order to be remembered. It is not that the memory is burned in and repressed, it is that the branding-iron is being constantly applied, and what is repressed is not the memory of it, but the experience of it.
- 60 Lefebvre, *Everyday Life in the Modern World*,
- 61 Henry David Thoreau. 1979 [1863]. "Life Without Principle" in *Thoreau: Walden and Other Writings*. New York, Bantam Books, 356.
- 62 Emerson, "Experience," 64.
- 63 Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist n.17"
- 64 Thoreau. "Life Without Principle," 359. See also, *Address of the International Working Men's Association to Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America*, Presented to U.S. Ambassador Charles Francis Adams January 28, 1865. Written by Marx between November 22 & 29, 1864; first published: *The Bee-Hive Newspaper*, No. 169, November 7, 1865.
- 65 Rosa Luxemburg. 1963 [1913]. *The Accumulation of Capital*. New York and London: Routledge.
- 66 Lefebvre, *Everyday Life in the Modern World*, 158.
- 67 Franz Kafka. 1948. *The Penal Colony*. New York: Schocken Books.
- 68 Kafka, *The Penal Colony*.
- 69 Thoreau, *Life Without Principle*, 373.

<sup>70</sup> *SpongeBob Squarepants*

<sup>71</sup> Graham Greene. 1958. *Our Man in Havana*. New York: Bantam Book.

<sup>72</sup> Max Horkheimer. 1993 [1931], "The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social Research" in *Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings*, 19.

<sup>73</sup> Horkheimer, "The Present Situation of Social Philosophy," 19.

<sup>74</sup> Horkheimer, "The Present Situation of Social Philosophy," 9-11.

<sup>75</sup> Horkheimer, "The Present Situation of Social Philosophy," 9.

<sup>76</sup> Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 68-69 and 80.

<sup>77</sup> Felix Guattari and Toni Negri. 1989. *Communists Like Us*. New York: Semiotext(e).

<sup>78</sup> Rosa Luxemburg in Paul Frolich. 1972. *Rosa Luxemburg: her Life and Work*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 248-249.

<sup>79</sup> *homo hominibus lupus*

<sup>80</sup> Marx, Interview, Chicago Sun. available from <http://www.marxists.org>

<sup>81</sup> Franz Kafka. "The Great Wall and the Tower of Babel" in *Parables and Paradoxes*, New York: Schocken Books, 27)

<sup>82</sup> Shakespeare, *Timon of Athens*.